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ON DOCTORS AND JUDGES 
BARAK RICHMAN† 
In convening the Conference on Measuring Judges and Justice 
and assembling this impressive Symposium, Dean David Levi and 
Professor Mitu Gulati urged the participating judges, political 
scientists, and law professors to “live in fragments no longer.”1 Within 
that same spirit of cross-fertilization—aiming to forge dialogue across 
disciplines and seeking lessons from unfamiliar professions—I 
introduce in this Response some lessons from studying the medical 
profession. Relying on economics and sociology more than political 
science,2 I suggest that there is much to learn about judges from 
thinking about doctors. 
A superficial comparison between doctors and judges suggests 
that their social roles have much in common. Both wear austere 
frocks of uniform color. Both publicly commit to solemn oaths before 
beginning service. Both are addressed by their professional titles to 
convey respect, even outside their workplace. Both are atop a strict 
hierarchy, in which their words receive the highest deference and 
their relationships with others are characterized by authority and 
control. 
For Nobel Prize–winning economist Kenneth Arrow, these social 
symbols were—for doctors—more than mere ornaments. In a seminal 
1963 article that gave birth to the field of health economics, Professor 
Arrow suggests that the social roles enjoyed by doctors, and the 
institutions and norms that characterize the doctor’s position of 
authority and deference, arise to solve economic problems inherent in 
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 1. David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, Introduction, “Only Connect”: Toward a Unified 
Measurement Project, 58 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1181 (2009) (quoting E.M. FORSTER, HOWARD’S END 
214 (Alfred A. Knopf 1943) (1921)). 
 2. My own foray into the political science literature on judges includes Mario Bergara, 
Barak Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The 
Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 247–48 (2003). 
RICHMAN IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:24:35 PM 
1732 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1731 
the delivery of healthcare.3 Healthcare services are “nonmarketable” 
because, among other reasons, they introduce uncertainty and 
unobservability, and thus a physician’s services cannot be evaluated 
and priced by a market of laypeople.4 Consequently, Arrow writes, 
nonmarket social institutions arise to improve upon the failure of the 
marketplace.5 Unlike most businesspeople, physicians are expected to 
prescribe advice and treatment that are divorced from their pecuniary 
interests, they are not expected to compete with other physicians on 
price or through advertising, and they are relied upon as experts. 
These nonmarket institutions convince patients they can seek care 
that they otherwise would distrust or, at the risk of harming others, 
underconsume. The financing and purchase of beneficial healthcare 
could not take place without mutually held and widely shared 
expectations that physicians are acting with utmost expertise and out 
of motivations purely designed to enhance the welfare of their 
patients. These expectations, Arrow writes, “are greatly assisted by 
having clear and prominent signals” and special relations that come 
from “various forms of ethical behavior.”6 
At the postscript of Professor Arrow’s article, he notes that 
“[t]he medical profession is only one example” in which market 
mechanisms fail to insure against uncertainty and that “[a]ll 
professions share some of the same properties.”7 Perhaps he had 
judges, and the courtroom, in mind. Similar nonmarket institutions 
and norms characterize the social relationships judges have with 
laypeople, and these institutions arguably arise to overcome similar 
problems of uncertainty. The social institutions and symbols that 
surround the judicial role—such as the robe, gavel, honorific title, and 
even the power to hold parties in contempt—sustain the authority 
that judges require to dispense the law. Individuals follow the law not 
just because of the threat of sanctions but also because of a strongly-
felt social norm, a deep reverence for the law, and a widespread belief 
in the prudence and integrity of the presiding judge. Indeed, without 
such social norms, it would be difficult to employ enough policemen 
to force compliance with the law or enough bailiffs to bring order in 
 
 3. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 947, 949–51 (1963). 
 4. See id. at 947, 951. 
 5. Id. at 947. 
 6. Id. at 965–66. 
 7. Id. at 967. 
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the courtroom. The severity of a judge’s decrees might even be 
compared to the severity of a doctor’s instructions. Failure to adhere 
to either is associated not just with risking personal welfare but also 
with exhibiting questionable judgment. 
Another similarity between doctors and judges—one that is 
highlighted by Professor Jack Knight’s excellent contribution to this 
Symposium—is that both are members of esteemed and insular 
communities.8 Knight refers to the importance of a judge’s 
professional community when he writes that the legitimacy of a 
judicial decision depends on whether the decision’s reasoning rests on 
“a reason that is included in that set of reasons about which there is a 
social consensus in the legal community.”9 Thus, judicial legitimacy is 
dependent on some notion of a professional community. 
Professor Knight’s selection of “community” is very deliberate—
he invokes it eleven times in his article and never uses a substitute 
word. Relying on the word has certain costs: it is necessarily vague; as 
other commentators at this Symposium have suggested, it means 
something different to each judge (some judges seek legitimacy from 
fellow members of the bench, others from members of the academy, 
and many from ideological organizations such as the Federalist 
Society or the American Constitution Society); and it points to an 
ineffable motivation or sensibility that is hard to verify or quantify. 
As a careful social scientist himself, and particularly as one who (as 
he does in this paper) encourages more meaningful empirical 
research, Knight might be expected to rely on terms that more easily 
succumb to measurement. 
Nonetheless, it is precisely the correct word to use. Professor 
Knight’s invocation of “community” intersects with another 
intellectual tradition that examines the nature of the professions. 
Professor William Goode, a former president of the American 
Sociological Association (a position that is, for sociologists, the 
lawyer’s equivalent of Chief Justice of the United States), wrote a 
foundational 1957 article, Community within a Community: The 
Professions.10 Goode observed that “a goal of each aspiring 
 
 8. Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decision-
making?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1550 (2009). 
 9. Id. at 1553. 
 10. William J. Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 22 AM. SOC. 
REV. 194 (1957). 
RICHMAN IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:24:35 PM 
1734 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1731 
occupation is the ‘community of profession’”11 that exhibits the 
following features: 
(1) Its members are bound by a sense of identity. (2) Once in it, few 
leave, so that it is a terminal or continuing status for the most part. 
(3) Its members share values in common. (4) Its role definitions vis-
à-vis both members and non-members are agreed upon and are the 
same for all members. (5) Within the areas of communal action 
there is a common language, which is understood only partially by 
outsiders. (6) The Community has power over its members. (7) Its 
limits are reasonably clear, though they are not physical and 
geographical, but social. (8) Though it does not produce the next 
generation biologically, it does so socially though its control over the 
selection of professional trainees, and though its training processes it 
sends these recruits through an adult socialization process.12 
By exacting such demands from its members, and by imposing 
such demanding entry requirements on potential members, these 
professions are able to occupy a privileged status in society, enjoying 
more prestige and autonomy than other occupations. They also enjoy 
recognition by the “containing community” as having elite education 
and socially valuable expertise. This expertise enables a quid-pro-quo, 
where the larger society bestows upon the professional community a 
vaunted status, consults with them on matters of significant policy, 
defers to their judgment, and delegates to them significant regulatory 
authority. In turn, the professional community pledges to share the 
fruits of their expertise with the rest of society and administer its 
power responsibly. 
Although Professor Goode writes generally about all professions 
and did not write with medical professionals exclusively in mind (he 
refers to physicians only in passing illustrations), his description of the 
community of professionals—its members’ motivations, its 
professional organization, its structural relationship with government 
and society, the content and meaning of professional duties and 
loyalties—have particular application to the medical profession. 
Professor Goode’s article is excerpted at length in the important 
Havighurst, Blumstein and Brennan casebook, Health Care Law and 
Policy,13 and other sociologists have similarly remarked on the 
 
 11. Id. at 194. 
 12. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 13. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN & TROYEN A. BRENNAN, HEALTH 
CARE LAW AND POLICY 288–93 (2d ed. 1998). 
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importance of professionalism in shaping the delivery of healthcare 
and health policy. Professor Paul Starr, for example, attributes the 
rise of medical authority to the social origins of professional 
sovereignty,14 and Jeffrey Berlant observes that the foothills of the 
first Code of Ethics for the American Medical Association (AMA) 
was motivated by writers who believed that “the Enlightenment and 
rationality were available only to elites paternalistically bound to 
assuming the burden of protecting the public [and thus] the only 
conceivable authority in medical matters was the practicing medical 
profession.”15 This vaunted position of responsibility and authority 
strikes a desirable chord for many current physicians, including 
Arnold Relman, a former editor of the New England Journal of 
Medicine, who includes in “The Role of the Medical Profession” the 
chore of making medical decisions and carefully allocating healthcare 
resources for all of society.16 The tradition of professionalism has also 
been an important force in shaping the field of health law, with “the 
professional paradigm” shaping the way lawyers, courts, and legal 
scholars look for coherence and integrity to the law’s many 
interactions with healthcare providers and institutions.17 
Professionalism’s impact on the delivery of healthcare has been 
met with decidedly mixed reviews. To be sure, there is much to 
admire from doctors’ commitment to professionalism. We appreciate 
the connotation of professionalism with public duty, and the medical 
profession deserves admiration for both a general commitment to 
healing and a particular commitment to providing medical services to 
patients regardless of their ability to pay. In addition, the profession’s 
code of ethics directs a fidelity to a patient’s welfare, and this 
commitment guides unknowledgeable laypeople through the 
complicated health system to receive valuable and often life-saving 
care. And professionalism also drives a devotion to science and 
discovery. Despite the enormous monetary rewards that the 
healthcare financing system brings to innovations and services in 
short supply, it is hard to discount the innovators’ underlying 
motivation to heal the currently incurable and to advance the 
 
 14. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 5–6 
(1982). 
 15. JEFFREY LIONEL BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY 93 (1975). 
 16. See Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
963, 967 (1980). 
 17. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of Medical Care: Obstacle to 
Decentralization, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415, 419–29 (1990). 
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frontiers of medical knowhow. These benefits might explain the 
containing community’s eagerness to support and advance 
professional norms and protect professional autonomy. It perhaps 
also is a reflection of what has been described as a collective nostalgia 
for “a simple world of doctors know best.”18 
However, as scholars of health law perhaps know as well as 
anyone else, medical professionalism also has imposed many 
significant social costs. The dominance of professionalism has 
motivated the AMA and other industry interests to preserve 
physician autonomy at all costs.19 Even as physicians claim to 
resolutely commit themselves to an ethical concern for patients’ 
interests, they continue to undermine efforts to restrain healthcare 
costs or focus on consumer needs.20 They are disdainful of efforts by 
third-party payors—whom physicians often decry as micromanagers 
of clinical decisions and intrusive, meddling bureaucrats—to enforce 
the limits of insurance contracts, including efforts to stem the costs of 
experimental, unproven, or unnecessary but shockingly expensive 
healthcare services.21 Physician groups and credentialing societies also 
mobilize to prevent less expensive healthcare providers from 
encroaching on their occupational territory, enabling them to 
continue extracting economic rents from premium payers.22 
 
 18. Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 365, 375 (2006). 
 19. See STARR, supra note 14, at 300 (“In short, the AMA insisted that all health insurance 
plans accept the private physicians’ monopoly control of the medical market and complete 
authority over all aspects of medical institutions.”); David Blumenthal, Commentary, The Vital 
Role of Professionalism in Health Care Reform, HEALTH AFF., Spring (I) 1994, at 252, 252 (“In 
most national health care debates, [professionalism] has been raised principally by opponents of 
reform—often organized medicine—and has been used for the explicit purpose of obstructing 
progress and protecting the self-interested prerogatives of the medical profession. Whatever the 
reform proposal, it is decried as a threat to medical professionalism and implicitly, therefore, a 
threat to the quality of care and the satisfaction of patients.”). 
 20. See Robert A. Berenson, Commentary, Do Physicians Recognize Their Own Best 
Interests?, HEALTH AFF., Spring (II) 1994, at 185, 187 (“The profession has proved incapable of 
disciplining itself to hold down costs or respond to consumer preferences.”). 
 21. See id. at 185–86; see also HAVIGURST ET AL., supra note 13, at 1349–52 (documenting 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield’s history of expanding insurance coverage and promoting the economic 
interests of providers and hospitals). 
 22. See, e.g., Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(questioning a medical society’s exclusion of a physician, who managed a multi-service practice, 
from referral directory); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 824–25 (N.J. 1963) 
(rejecting a hospital medical staff’s efforts to deny staff privileges to an osteopath); STARR, 
supra note 14, at 87 (quoting an early physician guide warning doctors to “be on guard against 
jealous midwives [and] ignorant doctor-women” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Consequently, professionalism has directly contributed to the nation’s 
escalating healthcare costs, which currently are at over 17 percent of 
our GDP and are as responsible as anything else for precipitating the 
current economic crisis.23  
Professionalism’s dedication to autonomy also has impeded 
valuable healthcare innovation and reform. Innovative policy reforms 
that aim to redesign the delivery of care (many with proven track 
records), such as integrated healthcare or enterprise liability, are met 
with resistance from physicians because they require a reorientation 
of or departure from the doctor’s traditional role.24 The profession 
also flexes its opposition through explicit political activity, with the 
AMA’s history of aggressively interfering with policy efforts to 
correct the nation’s health disparities or mitigate its budget shortfalls. 
Sometimes the profession’s interference was patently illegal; it has an 
unpleasant history of orchestrating illegal boycotts to punish early 
versions of HMOs and other innovative managed care plans.25 This 
history is supplemented by a much longer list of antitrust battles, in 
which physicians organized under professional umbrellas to avoid 
price competition, prevent advertising and quality competition, 
punish innovators or nonconformists, and deny patients the 
opportunity to seek alternatives to traditional delivery mechanisms of 
 
 23. Healthcare spending in 2009 is projected at 17.6 percent of GDP, the largest in history 
and—at one full percentage point larger than 2008—the biggest increase in history. It is 
expected to increase annually by 6.2 percent, 2.1 percentage points faster than average annual 
growth in GDP. Andrea Sisko et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2018: Recession 
Effects Add Uncertainty to the Outlook, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 24, 2009, at w346, w346–47, w356. 
Rising healthcare costs (the average cost to insure a family of four is approaching $13,000 a 
year) is squeezing working class incomes, precipitating bankruptcies, causing home foreclosures, 
triggering layoffs, and spreading the ranks of the uninsured. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2008 
ANNUAL SURVEY 1 ex.A (2008), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf (reporting the 
average cost of family coverage as $12,680 for 2008); ROBERT W. SEIFERT, ACCESS PROJECT, 
HOME SICK: HOW MEDICAL DEBT UNDERMINES HOUSING SECURITY 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/home_sick.pdf (detailing the effect of medical debt on low- 
and middle-income families); Christopher Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The 
Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 66 (2008); David U. 
Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 
2005, at w5-63, w5-66 to -68 (presenting a study detailing the medical causes of bankruptcy). 
Many employers fear that health spending may eventually overtake profits. See Will Health 
Benefit Costs Eclipse Profits?, MCKINSEY Q. CHART FOCUS (McKinsey & Co., New York, 
N.Y.), Sept. 2004, http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/newsletters/chartfocus/2004_09.htm.  
 24. Alain Enthoven, Curing Fragmentation with Integrated Delivery Systems 9–19 (Aug. 2, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 25. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff’d, 317 
U.S. 519 (1943). 
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care.26 Professionalism pits healthcare providers directly at odds with 
the aims of competition and stated antitrust policy. 
And, most relevant to the focus of this Symposium, the tradition 
of professionalism has contributed to widespread antagonism to 
measures of quality. It is commonplace that medical errors are both 
pervasive and costly in our healthcare system, but errors are often 
depersonalized as either latent errors beyond human control or 
intrinsic or endemic error that cannot be avoided. Marianne Paget, a 
sociologist whose life was shortened by medical error, observed that: 
Physicians do not talk freely about errors in their work. They are 
commonly reticent or silent about them. When they do talk, they 
frequently prefer technical terms, terms that mask their experience 
of error. . . . Too, the idea of endemic error radically undermines 
their claim to expertise. Rather, it throws the claim of expertise 
under new light. Physicians are “expert” in a work that proceeds by 
trial and error.27 
Perhaps this is a professionally-motivated fear of appearing 
unprofessional. Professor Arrow would offer a sympathetic, yet 
perhaps sardonic, explanation for such fears: since the perception of 
expertise—regardless of the underlying reality—supports the 
required trust for physician advice and instructions, the mere doubt of 
expertise could destabilize a foundation for the delivery of healthcare. 
This would explain why outsiders—whether plaintiff attorneys or 
health economists—who aim to discover and understand the costs of 
medical errors are viewed by physicians with extreme skepticism and 
often hostility. It is safe to generalize that doctors have genuine 
contempt for the tort system, and they express regular anger that 
judges and juries cannot understand the difficulties, demands, and 
constraints of practicing medicine.28 They also are resistant to 
research that examines the doctor-patient relationship with social 
scientific methods, whether seeking systemic causes for misdiagnosis 
or inconsistent treatments, because such measurements (they claim) 
 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Or. State Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 328–30 (1952). 
 27. MARIANNE A. PAGET, A COMPLEX SORROW: REFLECTIONS ON CANCER AND AN 
ABBREVIATED LIFE 15 (Marjorie L. DeVault ed., 1993) (emphasis omitted). 
 28. See, e.g., PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN 
THE MANAGED CARE ERA 25–26 (2002) (“Physicians resent being sued and having their 
clinical practices and motivations impugned by laypersons.”); see also, e.g., George J. Annas, 
Doctors and Lawyers and Wolves, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 437, 437 (1989) (lamenting the fact that 
“[r]elations between lawyers and physicians . . . are getting more and more destructive and 
counterproductive”).  
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cannot possibly capture the complexity and nuance of the physician’s 
responsibilities.29 And they oppose intelligent efforts to construct 
clinical guidelines that might codify standards of care. Such proposals 
are derided as advancing “cookbook medicine,” threatening physician 
practice autonomy and professional discretion, even though they are 
sensible attempts to bring accountability for medical errors.30 
One consequence of such hostility is that these inquiries into the 
healthcare system are not met with the seriousness that they deserve. 
Reforms to the tort system are badly needed, but physician groups 
prefer to impose damage caps rather than to seek institutional 
improvements that can uncover and deter errors. And non-medical 
disciplines offer tools that can help remedy some of medicine’s most 
critical shortcomings. The social sciences can, for example, measure 
cognitive biases and heuristics that might unconsciously influence 
physician decisionmaking, examine self-dealing and expose the costs 
of fee-for-service medicine, and develop organizational efficiencies 
that can help reorganize healthcare to contain expenses while 
carefully monitoring quality. The industry would benefit enormously 
from these inquiries by outsiders, and many of those benefits would 
accrue to the professionals themselves. 
The question invited by this Symposium is whether any of these 
lessons can be fruitfully applied to judges and the judicial process. As 
a preliminary matter, there are strong currents of professionalism in 
the judiciary. This is vividly captured by Professor Jack Knight’s focus 
on how consensus within a legal community bestows legitimacy to 
judicial acts. It is also highlighted by Dean Levi and Professor 
Gulati’s observation that “there is probably no topic of greater 
importance and interest to judges in the United States than judicial 
independence,”31 just as physicians have expressed the same devotion 
to their own professional autonomy. Many of the motivations, 
identities, and values connected to Professor Goode’s description of 
professional communities readily apply to the community of judges. 
 
 29. See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 28, at 154 (“Since [the rise of managed care], physicians 
have complained about . . . being second-guessed by non-physician managed care 
administrators” even though “[m]ost research has concluded that managed care’s quality is 
roughly equivalent (i.e., there are no significant differences in most areas) to quality of care in 
the fee-for-service system.”). 
 30. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S., 
90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 952–53 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. Levi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1187. 
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Additionally, like doctors, judges and legal academics often 
exhibit disregard for, and often hostility toward, outsiders who 
employ non-legal analytical methods to assess judicial quality, 
understand judicial reasoning, or predict judicial outcomes. 
Objections include charges that social scientists rely on imprecise 
measurements, excessively narrow (though I prefer the term 
“parsimonious”) theoretical constructs, and a general unfamiliarity 
with the judicial process. All of these are legitimate objections to the 
current literature, and symposia such as this one can lead to 
significant improvements in the empirical study of judges. But these 
objections also assume a tone of territorialism, that social scientific 
methods have nothing to add to—and have no place in—the 
discussion of judicial quality. There is something about this 
scholarship that seems to threaten judicial authority, something 
threatening about the invocation of insights from those outside the 
judicial and traditional legal community.32 These reactions very much 
resemble physician hostility to efforts by nonphysicians to reform 
medicine. 
Does this inhospitality to social scientific critiques have 
consequences similar to the costly failure to critically examine and 
reform the American healthcare system? Professor Kenneth Arrow 
might offer a cynical justification—that we need to maintain 
perceptions of judicial authority, objectivity, and perhaps infallibility 
to maintain social order and sustain compliance with and reverence 
for the law. One might call this the Emperor-Has-No-Clothes 
defense. We must not look behind the curtain, for once we realize 
that judges are as ideological, cognitively biased, and expedient as 
other human beings, we will begin to question the social norms that 
serve as irreplaceable societal foundations. 
A more modest normative conclusion—and the only one I offer 
here—is that conferences such as the one that spawned this 
 
 32. The Gulati, Choi, and Posner article that ranks judges is perhaps a paradigmatic 
example of a quality assessment by outsiders that has traditionally provoked hostility from the 
professional community. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial 
Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1313, 1317 (2009). Professor Goode writes, 
Of course, professions are accustomed to ratings. . . . Professional life is so 
fundamentally based on achievement, that such judgments of rank are made 
constantly. . . . However, such data are not generally available to the public, and are 
not widely known, even when not secret. The professional community will not rank 
its members for the larger society; and the latter cannot do so. 
Goode, supra note 10, at 198. 
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Symposium, in which social scientists and judges are encouraged to 
bring their respective and different toolkits to engage constructively 
with each other, offer unique opportunities to address these issues. 
One issue that I hope is addressed in these and future cross-
occupational gatherings—and an issue that I think is ripe for 
interdisciplinary examination—is the powerful strain of 
professionalism in the judicial community. Does appreciating judicial 
professionalism bring clarity and transparency to the judicial process, 
or does it obfuscate the lucidity of the law? Does it humanize what 
judges do, or does it expose an underbelly of judicial decisionmaking? 
Does it justify judicial outcomes, or does it immunize judges from 
appropriate scrutiny and accountability? I submit that these are 
important questions, that interdisciplinary and interprofessional 
exchanges such as these are in unique and valuable positions to 
address those questions, and that—respectfully—the social scientist 
can, as an outsider, generate significant insights into the judicial 
process that academic and professional insiders cannot. 
 
